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EMPLOYMENT LAW
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Jennifer A. Youpa ***
I. INTRODUCTION
S labor and employment law practitioners, we all know that em-
ployers and ex-employees resolve differences through severance
agreements or settlement agreements. As a matter of public pol-
icy, the law should favor such agreements. However, in the current Sur-
vey period, a novel-and some might say startling-decision out of the
Fourth Circuit takes away employers' security of knowing that a settle-
ment is final and binding. This Article explores this new trend and the
relationship to the case law in Texas and the Fifth Circuit.
This Article also reviews when comparisons are relevant to establish
unlawful discrimination. The courts provided Texas practitioners with
some clarification of the similarly situated evidentiary burden. After re-
viewing several cases decided in the Survey period, it appears that plain-
tiffs will have a much more difficult time finding evidence to establish
unlawful acts of discrimination.
In the past two years, the authors have discussed a perfectly rational
way for the courts to apply the United States Supreme Court's 2003 inter-
pretation of Title VII described in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.1 When
interpreting the Texas Labor Code, the Texas Supreme Court had already
recognized that the plain language of the statute states that, in order to
prevail, a plaintiff must establish that his protected characteristic moti-
vated the employer to commit an act of discrimination. In other words, a
"mixed-motive" case does not exist under the language of the statute.
Despite the statute's plain language, courts are still struggling. Courts are
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still hanging onto the mixed-motive analysis, and the courts of appeal are
beginning to split on the impact of Desert Palace.
II. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
A. You SAY POTATO, I SAY FRENCH FRIES: COURTS CLARIFY
WHAT "SIMILARLY SITUATED" MEANS IN
DISPARATE-DISCIPLINE LITIGATION
The question of whether discrimination has occurred is essentially a
question of whether an employer failed to treat a plaintiff the same as
others when no reasonable distinction exists between the favored and un-
favored. So stated, the question of discrimination is naturally, and often,
comparative in nature.
But while comparative evidence holds the spotlight as a primary
method of demonstrating discrimination, 2 during the Survey period, ap-
pellate courts clarified that lower courts should hone scrutiny of "similar-
ity" comparisons. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as well
as the Texas Supreme Court provided some contours to the amorphous
notion of "similarity" in four cases-Dodge v. Hertz Corp.,3 Ysleta Inde-
pendent School District v. Monarrez,4 Bryant v. Compass Group U.S.A.,
Inc.,5 and Perez v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional
Division.6
Javier Perez, the plaintiff in Perez v. Texas Department of Criminal Jus-
tice, Institutional Division, was a lieutenant at the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") charged with felony assault for allegedly stab-
bing a former inmate at a local bar.7 Despite being advised that his state-
ments would not be used against him in a subsequent criminal trial
(under the holding of Garrity v. New Jersey8), Perez refused to discuss the
incident with the warden, except to proclaim his innocence. After cau-
tioning Perez that agency policy required that he give a statement and
that failure to cooperate could result in disciplinary action, the matter
was referred to Internal Affairs, an independent investigative arm of the
TDCJ. The investigators concluded that Perez had violated agency rules
"by engaging in conduct that jeopardized the integrity of the agency,"
which required a termination recommendation. After reviewing the in-
vestigatory findings and conducting a disciplinary hearing in which Perez,
2. See e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) ("Especially
relevant . . . would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against [the em-
ployer] of comparable seriousness ... were nevertheless retained or rehired.").
3. 124 F. App'x 242 (5th Cir. 2005).
4. 177 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. 2005).
5. 413 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2005).
6. 395 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2005).
7. Id. at 208-09.
8. 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (holding that statements made by a police officer
under threat of termination generally cannot be used against him in a subsequent criminal
trial); see also Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070, 1073 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that state-
ments compelled by threat of termination cannot be used in a subsequent criminal trial).
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on advice of counsel, again refused to discuss the stabbing incident, the
warden recommended termination. Perez was discharged. Notably, the
criminal charges were later dropped because the victim would not coop-
erate with the prosecutor.9
Perez sued under Title VII alleging race discrimination and claiming
that TDCJ had treated him more harshly than two other non-Hispanic
employees, one of whom had been charged with involuntary manslaugh-
ter but ultimately pled guilty to misdemeanor driving while intoxicated,
and another who was arrested for initiating a drunken assault. Under
agency rules, conviction of a misdemeanor did not warrant termination,
but the TDCJ reprimanded both and placed one on probation. In neither
case was an Internal Affairs investigation conducted. At trial, the warden
conceded that the crimes attributed to Perez and the other two were com-
parably serious. 10
The trial court instructed the jury that employees are similarly situated
when the comparator employees' misconduct is of a quantity and quality
that is of "comparable seriousness" to the misconduct of the plaintiff.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perez, but TDCJ appealed, arguing
that the "comparable seriousness" instruction allowed the jury to apply
too lenient a standard to assess whether the comparators were "similarly
situated" because it focused only on the seriousness of the misconduct
rather than the comparability of their overall circumstances. The Fifth
Circuit agreed.11
The Fifth Circuit explained that the trial court's use of the "comparable
seriousness" requirement came from the United States Supreme Court's
holding in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., in which an
employer accused white and black employees of stealing a shipment of
antifreeze. 12 The employer terminated the white employees but retained
the black employees, and the white employees sued under Title VII.13
The employer argued that the white employees had to plead with particu-
larity the degree of similarity in culpability, but the Supreme Court said
precise equivalence in culpability is not the ultimate question; rather, re-
lying on the Court's holding in McDonnell Douglas, an allegation that
other employees were involved in acts against the employer of "compara-
ble seriousness" is adequate to plead an inferential case. 14
The Perez court observed, however, that the trial court's utilization of
the "comparable seriousness" standard from McDonald failed to account
for the markedly different facts of McDonald and Perez's case-the em-
ployees in McDonald were all participants in the same theft and their
degree of culpability was the only arguable distinction (other than
9. Perez, 395 F.3d at 209.
10. Id. at 214.
11. Id. at 213.
12. 427 U.S. 273, 276 (1976).
13. Id. at 275-76.
14. Id. at 282.
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race). 15 In other words, the "comparable seriousness" language from Mc-
Donnell Douglas and McDonald did not articulate the entirety of the
plaintiff's burden when seeking to compare treatment following arguably
similar misconduct. 16 Instead, the trial court should have examined the
Fifth Circuit's repeated instruction that for employees to be similarly situ-
ated to comparator employees, the comparator employees' circumstances
must have been "nearly identical. 1' 7 Thus, a correctly worded instruction
makes clear that the jury must find the employees' circumstances, not
merely their misconduct, to have been nearly identical in order to find
them similarly situated.18
In Perez' case, the jury could have concluded that Perez was not simi-
larly situated to the other employees because TDCJ presented a number
of other potentially significant distinctions among their circumstances.
For example, Perez had refused to cooperate with the investigation. And,
only Perez had assaulted an ex-inmate, which gave rise to a concern of
illegal activity within the prison. In fact, this concern explained why an
Internal Affairs investigation was initiated for Perez but not the others.
These differences, the court explained, were irrelevant to the comparative
seriousness of the misconduct, but a jury could find them relevant to the
question of whether their respective circumstances were "nearly
identical." 19
In its analysis of whether the trial court erred by refusing, on irrele-
vance grounds, to allow TDCJ to cross-examine Perez about his actual
involvement in the stabbing, the Perez court provided additional contours
to the plaintiff's "similarly situated" burden. The court explained that
evidence relevant to an inquiry of whether TDCJ discriminated against
Perez on account of his race is evidence that sheds light on what the deci-
sionmaker knew at the time of his decision. In other words, the issue is
whether Perez and his alleged comparator employees were similarly situ-
ated from the perspective of their employer at the time of the relevant
decisions. Thus, evidence about what actually happened the night of the
stabbing could not have added anything relevant to that inquiry.20
While Perez clarifies that the "circumstances" between the plaintiff and
comparator employees must be nearly identical, the court in Bryant v.
15. Perez, 395 F.3d at 212.
16. Id. at 212-13.
17. Id. at 213 (citing Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991)).
18. Id. at 213-14.
19. Id. at 214.
20. Id. at 210 (citing Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 767 F.2d 771, 774 (11th Cir.
1985) ("Failure to promote a plaintiff because the person actually promoted was more
qualified is a nondiscriminatory reason, but the articulation of that reason must include the
fact that the decision-maker knew that the promoted individual's qualifications were supe-
rior at the time the decision was made."); Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 319 (5th Cir.
2004) (stating that "the ultimate issue is the employer's reasoning at the moment the ques-
tioned [ ] decision is made, [so] justification that could not have motivated [that] decision is
... irrelevant"); Sabree v. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396,
404 (1st Cir. 1990) ("emphasizing the importance of focusing on the employer['s] rationale
at the time of the decision rather than post hoc rationalizations")).
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Compass Group USA Inc.21 and Dodge v. Hertz Corp.22 reiterated that
the comparative misconduct (and its consequences to the employer) is an
aspect of the "circumstances" that must be "nearly identical" to be suffi-
ciently (and relevantly) "similarly situated." In Bryant, the plaintiff
worked as a cook at Lamar University for the independently contracted
food-service operator, Compass Group USA Inc. ("Chartwells"). During
a bat mitzvah on campus catered by Chartwells, a co-worker observed the
plaintiff take an envelope from the gift table. The co-worker suspected
that Bryant disposed of the envelope in the trash, so she returned the
following day when it was brighter and found three envelopes and three
checks in the trash. She informed the executive chef and provided a
statement to the food-services director. Another event employee pro-
vided a statement to a Lamar University police officer.23
Bryant spoke to the officer the following day. Bryant agreed to pay the
$26 missing from the envelopes but also indicated that he was only doing
so under duress and maintained his innocence. The officer informed
Chartwells, however, that Bryant confessed and agreed to make restitu-
tion, and upon learning this, Chartwells terminated Bryant's employment.
At Bryant's trial for race discrimination under Title VII, Bryant intro-
duced evidence that Chartwells did not discipline the employee who gave
the officer a statement in a similar manner (or at all) when she stole alco-
hol and party decorations. The jury found that Bryant and the employee
were similarly situated, as they were "among the low level hourly
employees. '24
On appeal, Chartwells successfully argued, among other things, that
the other employee was not similarly situated and that insufficient evi-
dence existed to support the jury's verdict. The court explained that the
alleged theft of alcohol and decorations is not "nearly identical" to steal-
ing money from a client's gift table-one involved an "internal situation,"
and the other could result in legal liability, loss of business, and have a
devastating effect on Chartwell's reputation. The court said that no jury
could have found these events to be "nearly identical. '2 5
The holding in Dodge v. Hertz Corp. likewise involved an assessment
of the comparative degree of misconduct similarity necessary to be
"nearly identical. '26 In Dodge, the plaintiff worked as a branch manager
of the rental-car company, and the company dismissed him for surrepti-
tiously altering numerous rental contracts to increase his incentive-based
compensation. The company said he was terminated for "dishonesty."
He claimed that Hertz terminated him because of his race and sex in
violation of Title VII. As evidence to overcome the company's motion
for summary judgment, the plaintiff pointed to the fact that Hertz disci-
21. 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005).
22. 124 F. App'x 242 (5th Cir. 2005).
23. Bryant, 413 F.3d at 474.
24. Id. at 478.
25. Id. at 478-79.
26. 124 F. App'x at 244.
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plined, but did not terminate, a white female branch manager when
money "went missing." The plaintiff tried to show that the comparator
employee was disciplined for "dishonesty," and that the circumstances for
both employees were therefore "nearly identical. '27
The court disagreed, holding that an employer's classification in the
same "broad category" of "dishonesty" does not warrant a conclusion
that the employees' circumstances were "nearly identical." In this regard,
the court explained that while a tardy employee who lies about his rea-
sons for being late and an embezzling employee are both engaged in "dis-
honest" behavior, the employer's response to the misconduct would
likely be radically different and could not be characterized as "nearly
identical." Thus, without probative evidence that a similarly situated em-
ployee received more favorable treatment, the plaintiff could not estab-
lish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.28
In Ysleta Independent School District v. Monarrez, the school district
terminated two male bus mechanics, Gustavo Monarrez and Jose Rodri-
guez, for their scheme to violate time-clock procedures. 29 The plaintiffs
hatched the scheme after an evening of drinking when Rodriguez raised
a concern about timely reporting to work the following day. Rodriguez
asked Monarrez to punch his card in the event that Rodriguez was late.
The following day, Monarrez reported to work and punched both his and
Rodriguez's timecard. Rodriguez called Monarrez later in the day to say
that he would not be coming to work, and at the end of the shift, Monar-
rez punched both cards making it appear as if both had worked a full day.
A few days later, they self-reported their time-card scheme, and the deci-
sion was made that they both would be terminated. 30
Both men subsequently sued, alleging that they received harsher treat-
ment than females in the department who had clocked-in for co-workers.
The appellate court affirmed the plaintiffs' favorable jury verdicts, and
the school district sought Texas Supreme Court review. Recognizing that
a showing of less-favorable treatment than similarly situated female em-
ployees was necessary for plaintiffs to prevail in their gender-discrimina-
tion claim under the Texas Labor Code, the supreme court explained for
the first time what "similarly situated" means in the employment-discrim-
ination context: employees are "similarly situated" if their circumstances
are comparable in all material respects, including similar standards, su-
pervisors, and conduct. Moreover, when attempting to prove discrimina-
tion based on disparate discipline, the law requires evidence of
comparative seriousness. Therefore, the supreme court's explanation of
"similarly situated" aligns with the federal court standard-similarity in
"4circumstances" encompasses but does not rest exclusively upon the com-
27. Id. at 243.
28. Id.




parative seriousness of misconduct.31
In this case, the supreme court observed that the nature and degree of
the time-card violations for which female employees (all of whom were
bus drivers and bus attendants) received written or verbal reprimands
was insufficiently similar to support the judgment. The plaintiffs intro-
duced no evidence that female time card-violations included a conspiracy
to conceal another employee's absence. Each disciplined female had at
least appeared for work, and some of the female reprimands involved
clock-ins for convenience sake. Because the respective misconduct was
not of "comparable seriousness," the supreme court rendered a take-
nothing judgment.32
B. DESERT PALACE UPDATE
In its 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that Title VII's prohibition against discrimina-
tion "because of" an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin did not mean solely because of such protected characteristics. 33
Therefore, the Court established a "mixed-motive" framework under
which an employee could demonstrate a prima facie case of an unlawful
employment practice by showing that discrimination or retaliation played
a "motivating part" or was a "substantial factor" in the employment deci-
sion.34 The employer could avoid damages, however, if it proved that it
would have made the same employment decision in the absence of the
unlawful motive. 35
Congress responded to the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive framework
by enacting section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
amended Title VII to provide standards for mixed-motive cases.36 The
1991 Act provided for employer liability based on evidence that an im-
permissible consideration was "a motivating factor" in the employer's
decision:
[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice. 37
In such cases, the 1991 Act also limited the employer's exposure to cer-
tain remedies by establishing a "same action" affirmative defense:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section
2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the re-
spondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the
31. Id. at 917.
32. Id. at 918.
33. 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
34. Id. at 244 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. at 244-45.
36. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2005) (emphasis added).
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impermissible motivating factor, the court-(i) may grant declara-
tory relief, injunctive relief. . ., and attorney's fees and costs... ; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admis-
sion, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment .... 38
Thus, the mixed-motive framework of the 1991 Act allows an employee
to establish a Title VII violation under section 2000e-2(m) without prov-
ing that an impermissible consideration was the sole or but-for motive for
the employment action, while providing the employer with a "limited af-
firmative defense" under section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
Before 2003, many courts held that plaintiffs would need to present
"direct," and not merely circumstantial, evidence of discrimination in or-
der to take advantage of the "mixed-motive" liability provision of section
2000e-2(m). 39 In its 2003 holding in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, how-
ever, the Supreme Court clarified that following the 1991 amendments to
Title VII, direct evidence of discrimination is not required to obtain a
mixed-motive instruction under section 2000e-2(m); rather, plaintiffs
need only present sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action.40
As reported in the 2004 Survey, a question arose within the bar follow-
ing Desert Palace as to whether the decision significantly altered the ap-
plication of McDonnell Douglas and summary-judgment practice in
disparate-treatment cases. Last year's Survey showed that most courts
concluded that the decision did not affect the availability of defense-
favorable summary judgments. 41 As discussed last year, however, the
Fifth Circuit concluded in its 2004 opinion in Rachid v. Jack in the Box,
Inc. that Desert Palace "modified" the third component of the three-pro-
nged McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, thereby giving plain-
tiffs two alternative approaches: after the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination and the employer demonstrates a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason rebutting the case, a plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence that either (1) the defendant's reason for its action
against the plaintiff is pretextual ("pretext alternative"); or (2) the defen-
dant's reason, while true, is one motivating factor behind the defendant's
action against the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff's protected characteristic
is another ("mixed-motive alternative"). 42
Notably, during this Survey period, the Fourth and Eighth Circuit
Courts of Appeals took up the issue of Desert Palace's impact on sum-
mary judgment. In Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co.,
38. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
39. See Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2002); Fernandes v. Costa
Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala.,
91 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1996); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995).
40. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02.
41. See also Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (I1th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the
view that Desert Palace nullified the McDonnell Douglas framework).
42. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
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the Fourth Circuit addressed the plaintiff's argument that, following De-
sert Palace, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach no longer
applies at the summary-judgment stage and all cases should be analyzed
as mixed-motive cases. 43 The Diamond court rejected this argument, ex-
plaining that a plaintiff can survive summary judgment following Desert
Palace in two ways: (1) by presenting either direct or circumstantial evi-
dence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's
protected characteristic motivated the employer's adverse employment
decision; or (2) the plaintiff can proceed under the McDonnell Douglas
pretext framework. 44
In Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., the Eighth Circuit first took note
of the fact that Desert Palace was a post-trial appeal and not a case pos-
tured after summary judgment.45 Desert Palace, the court observed, ad-
dressed issues that arose in proceedings after the plaintiff had presumably
already established genuine controversy as to whether the adverse em-
ployment action was motivated, at least in part, by discrimination based
on a protected characteristic. By contrast, at the summary judgment
stage, the controlling issue ordinarily is whether there exists a genuine
issue of fact regarding any discriminatory motive. Therefore, the court
said "Desert Palace really has no direct impact in the summary judgment
context. "
46
This approach, the Eighth Circuit concluded, is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, in which the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's proof of pretext is relevant to, but
not dispositive of, the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination. 47
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace, to the extent rele-
vant, merely reaffirms that a plaintiff bringing an employment-discrimi-
nation claim may succeed in resisting a motion for summary judgment if
the evidence, direct or circumstantial, establishes a genuine issue of fact
regarding an unlawful motivation for the adverse employment action
(that is, a motivation based upon a protected characteristic), even though
the plaintiff may not be able to create genuine doubt as to the truthful-
ness of a different, yet lawful, motivation. 48
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits' analyses are slightly, yet importantly,
different from the Fifth Circuit's. For example, under the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning, the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie case is
a mechanism peculiar to the pretext framework. The Eighth Circuit's
reasoning likewise rejects strict adherence to the analytical forms. This is
slightly different than the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit, as evi-
denced by its 2005 decision in Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., in which it
43. 416 F.3d 310, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2005).
44. Id. at 18.
45. 398 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2005).
46. Id. at 1017 (citing Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 n.2 (8th Cir.
2004)).




explained that the "modified" analysis only comes after the plaintiff's es-
tablishment of a prima facie case and the defendant's articulation of a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason.49 Thus, under this reasoning, re-
gardless of the "alternative" used, a Fifth Circuit plaintiff (if armed only
with circumstantial evidence) must initially establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
1. Desert Palace: Is It a Mirage in Title VII Retaliation Claims?
Retaliation claims arise out of a separate provision in Title VII that
makes it an "unlawful employment practice" for an employer to discrimi-
nate against an employee who "has opposed any practice [that this sub-
chapter deems] an unlawful employment practice, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. ' 50 As with
disparate-treatment claims, courts have long applied the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting paradigm to retaliation claims brought under Ti-
tle VII and state equivalents.
Notably, however, in Jack v. Texaco Research Center, the Fifth Circuit
held that "whether or not there were other reasons for the employer's ac-
tion, the employee will prevail [in a Title VII retaliation case] only by
proving that 'but for' the protected activity she would not have been sub-
jected to the action of which she claims. ' 51 While Jack is a case pre-
dating the 1991 amendments, the Fifth Circuit also cited the above lan-
guage from Jack with approval in defining the standard of causation in
the 1996 retaliation case of Long v. Eastfield College.52 Additionally, al-
though the Fifth Circuit modified the McDonnell Douglas analysis in light
of Desert Palace in cases in which the mixed-motive analysis might apply,
retaliation was not explicitly included in the Supreme Court's Desert Pal-
ace decision.53
More importantly, while the Fifth Circuit has not expressly addressed
the question of whether the amended statute applies in Title VII retalia-
tion cases,54 circuits addressing the issue have concluded that the mixed-
motive provisions of the 1991 Act do not apply to retaliation claims. 55
49. 407 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2005).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
51. 743 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
52. 88 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1996).
53. It is worth noting, however, that age discrimination actionable under the ADEA
was likewise not addressed by Desert Palace, but the Fifth Circuit nonetheless extended its
holding to claims brought under the ADEA. See Rachid, 376 F.3d at 305.
54. Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 403 (5th Cir. 2000)
(expressly reserving same). The Fifth Circuit addressed the application of a mixed-motive
proof scheme in a retaliation case in Fabela v. Socorro Independent School District, but that
case was analyzed with direct, not circumstantial, evidence. 329 F.3d 409, 416-17 (5th Cir.
2003); see also Hamilton v. Tex. DOT, 85 F. App'x 8, 14 (5th Cir. 2004) (no mention of
applicability in post-Desert Palace retaliation case).
55. See e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001);
Speedy v. Rexnord Corp., 243 F.3d 397, 397 (7th Cir. 2001); Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68,
81 (2d Cir. 2000); Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2000);
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These courts reason that even though retaliation is deemed an "unlawful
employment practice" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), which is the same label
given to discrimination on one of the five grounds listed in section 107(a)
of the 1991 Act, retaliation is not listed.56 Thus, because a reference to
retaliation claims is noticeably absent from section 2000e-2(m), that sec-
tion (and thus, the mixed-motive framework) does not apply to retalia-
tion claims, and Price Waterhouse continues to provide the relevant
standards of proof and persuasion for mixed-motive retaliation claims. 57
Some courts within the Fifth Circuit, however, have chosen to utilize a
mixed-motive analysis in Title VII retaliation claims, 58 although the pro-
priety of applying the Fifth Circuit's "modified" McDonnell Douglas
analysis to retaliation claims has not been fully accepted. 59 In its 2005
opinion in Septimus v. University of Houston, the Fifth Circuit explicitly
reserved the question of whether the mixed-motive analysis applies to
Title VII retaliation claims. 60 In Septimus, the court confronted several
retaliation claims based on circumstantial evidence. Under a pretext
analysis, the court held that a but-for causation standard is appropriate,
and because the parties agreed that the claims were tried and litigated
under the "pretext" alternative rather than mixed-motive, the court
stated that it was not considering Desert Palace's impact on Title VII re-
taliation cases.61
The Fifth Circuit's decision in the FMLA retaliation case of Richardson
v. Monitronics International, Inc., however, may provide insight into how
the Fifth Circuit would approach the availability of a mixed-motive analy-
sis in Title VII retaliation cases. 62 In Richardson, the plaintiff requested,
and her employer granted, intermittent FMLA leave, but by the time of
Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott
Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 933 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997); Tanca v.
Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 682 (1st Cir. 1996).
56. Kubicko, 181 F.3d at 552 n.7 (citing McNutt v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 141
F.3d 706, 707-08 (7th Cir. 1998)); Woodson, 109 F.3d at 933; Tanca, 98 F.3d at 682-85; see
also Behne v. Microtouch Sys., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098-99 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("In
response to Price Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII to permit plaintiffs in mixed
motive discrimination cases to obtain injunctive relief and recover attorneys fees and costs.
Congress did not provide for the same relief, however, to plaintiffs in mixed-motive retalia-
tion cases."), affid, Behne v. 3m Microtouch Sys., Inc., 11 F. App'x 856, 856 (9th Cir. 2001).
57. See Funai v. Brownlee, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1228, 1234 (D. Haw. 2004).
58. See Calmat Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 364 F.3d 1117, 1123 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004);
Warren v. Terex Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 641, 646 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Bergen v. Cont'l Cas.
Co., 368 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572-73 (N.D. Tex. 2005); Cones v. Duke Energy Corp., 367 F.
Supp. 2d 1092, 1100 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Knighten v. State Fair of La., No. Civ.A.03-1930,
2005 WL 1629933, at *4 (W.D. La. July 1, 2005); Brooks v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
No. 3:03-CV-3018-B, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23959, at *18-21 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2004);
Bell v. Bank of Am., No. 3:03-CV-2650-B, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11649, at *23-24 (N.D.
Tex. June 14, 2005).
59. McCarthy v. Primedia Workplace Learning, L.P., No. 3:04-CV-760-M, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31869, at *13 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2005) (recognizing that modified analysis
might not apply); Alvarez v. UPS Co., 398 F. Supp. 2d 542 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (same).
60. 399 F.3d 601, 607 n.7 (5th Cir. 2005).
61. Id. at 607.
62. 454 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2005). While the Richardson case might provide insight into
how the court will address Title VII retaliation, it is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit has
2006] 1221
SMU LAW REVIEW
her termination, the plaintiff had accumulated four and a half "occur-
rences" under the employer's attendance policy, which excluded any
FMLA leaves. According to the policy, four "occurrences" were cause
for termination. After filing her FMLA-retaliation lawsuit, the employer
sought summary judgment. 63
The employer argued that, even if the plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case, she could not present sufficient evidence to rebut that it fired
her for attendance-policy violations. Utilizing an "un-modified" McDon-
nell Douglas framework, the trial court granted the employer's motion.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that even though retaliation might not
have been the sole reason for her termination, it was a motivating factor
in it, and therefore, the trial court should have employed the "modified"
McDonnell Douglas approach. The Fifth Circuit agreed. 64
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on its pronouncement in
the 2004 Rachid decision that Desert Palace modified the McDonnell
Douglas framework. The Rachid case did not involve Title VII, which (as
explained above) was amended by the 1991 Act to expressly prohibit the
use of a certain characteristic as "a motivating factor," but instead in-
volved the ADEA, which prohibits discrimination "because of" age. In
Rachid, the court discounted the absence of "explicit statutory text" in
the ADEA making mixed-motive cases actionable.65
Thus, even though the FMLA (like the ADEA) has no "explicit statu-
tory text" either countenancing or prohibiting a mixed-motive analysis,
the Richardson court concluded that a mixed-motive framework "is not at
odds" with the statutory text. Moreover, the court pointed to the FMLA
regulations as a "textual basis" for applying a mixed-motive analysis be-
cause the regulations prohibit the use of "FMLA leave as a negative fac-
tor in employment actions. '66
Thus, the Richardson court concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to
have her retaliation claim evaluated under a mixed-motive analytical
framework A la Rachid. In this regard, the plaintiff presented evidence
that a month before her termination, she heard her manager say, "We'll
just fire her ass. We'll worry about it later." When Richardson later con-
fronted the manager, the manager stated that he was "tired of all of this
stuff." Even though the manager's statement to her could relate to Rich-
ardson's attendance-policy violations, this evidence, the court concluded,
constituted sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the
exercise of her FMLA rights was a motivating factor in her discharge
because the statements could also relate to her FMLA leaves. 6 7
recognized that Title VII's retaliation provisions are distinct from other provisions, unlike
those upon which anti-retaliation prohibitions in other statutes are based.
63. Id. at 332.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 334.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 335.
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The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's award of summary judgment
in favor of the employer, because the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
employer met its burden of showing that it would have fired her despite
any retaliatory motive. The court observed that the attendance policy
"undeniably specifies that four occurrences result in termination," and
the company "always maintained a company policy that attendance is a
key consideration in determining whether an employee is entitled to con-
tinued employment." Thus, because Richardson had more than four oc-
currences, this overcame the plaintiff's evidence consisting "entirely of
ambiguous or conclusional statements," and the only conclusion a reason-
able jury could make is that the employer would have fired the plaintiff
with or without retaliatory animus.
The Richardson decision is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the
case confirms Keelan's holding that a plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case before being able to take advantage of the mixed-motive
framework, which, as outlined above, departs from the reasoning of sev-
eral sister circuits. Second, the Richardson court's importation of the
"same action" affirmative defense is noteworthy because the "same ac-
tion" defense is not found in the FMLA. But even so, that defense (at
least as described by the 1991 Act) merely limits the plaintiff's damages
to attorney's fees and injunctive relief. The Richardson court, however,
ruled that the plaintiff had created an issue of fact as to liability (that is,
whether her leave was a motivating factor), yet it nonetheless affirmed
dismissal of the plaintiff's entire case without any relief-in effect, mak-
ing the defense fully affirmative. Finally, the court's analysis continues to
appear to become unhinged from statutory foundations, which is a signifi-
cant obstacle in reconciling Title VII's retaliation provisions with the 1991
Act's motivating-factor amendments. 68
Given the interpretive struggles courts continue to have with Desert
Palace, and the fact that circuit splits are becoming evident, it is likely
that the Supreme Court will have to revisit the issue to clean-up the ana-
lytical framework.
C. FOURTH CIRCUIT EMPLOYEES LEARN THAT
BREAKING UP Is HARD TO Do
During this Survey period, the Fourth Circuit gave employers reason to
pause before negotiating settlement agreements that include FMLA-
claim releases. In Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., the plaintiff-employee
missed a great deal of work due to pain and swelling in her legs.69 Al-
though the employee requested FMLA leave on several occasions, it was
denied. As a result of the employee's excessive absences, she received a
poor productivity rating and was chosen for termination in a subsequent
reduction in force. Upon her termination, her employer provided her
68. See id. at 334.
69. 415 F.3d 364, 365 (4th Cir. 2005)
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with the company's standard severance package, which included a re-
quirement that she execute a release in return for additional monetary
compensation and other severance benefits. The employee signed the re-
lease, received the benefits pursuant to the agreement, but later sued the
employer alleging that her discharge violated the FMLA.70
In response to the employer's motion for summary judgment, the em-
ployee argued that Department of Labor ("DOL") regulations prohib-
ited the enforcement of the release.71 Under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d),
"[ejmployees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to
waive, their rights under the FMLA. ' 72 The district court, relying on the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Faris v. Williams WPC-I,
Inc.,73 held that the regulation did not apply to the retrospective waiver
or release of FMLA rights or claims of discrimination or retaliation for
exercising FMLA rights and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that the regulation's plain language
prohibits both the retrospective and prospective waiver or release of an
employee's substantive and prospective FMLA rights.74 The court based
its reasoning on the premise that the DOL and Congress intended that
the FMLA parallel the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), which bars
the waiver of substantive or prospective rights without prior DOL or
court approval, regardless of whether the rights are waived by agreement
or ratification. 75 Thus, in Taylor, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
regulation unambiguously prohibited all types of purported FMLA waiv-
ers and that the DOL's interpretation reasonably construed congressional
intent. 76
Following Taylor, employers seeking to settle claims of FMLA viola-
tions without DOL or court approval, or to negotiate broad releases and
waiver of claims in connection with separation agreements, must consider
this important development. The benefit of a release to an employer is
greatly reduced when a release cannot be enforced against all claims. As
noted above, however, Taylor poses problems at this time only for Fourth
Circuit employers because the decision is at odds with the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Faris v. Williams WPC-I Inc., which also involved the interpre-
tation of section 825.220(d). 77 The Fifth Circuit distinguished substan-
tive-right waivers during employment and proscriptive-right waivers
made upon termination, concluding that the regulation's prohibition is
limited to the former. Therefore, post-dispute claims could be waived by
private agreement.
70. Id. at 366-67.
71. Id. at 368.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2005).
73. 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003)
74. Taylor, 415 F.3d at 371.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Faris, 332 F.3d at 318.
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Employers trying to work through the waiver problem arising from
Taylor should consider how some employers have done the same in the
FLSA context. For example, some employers seeking to settle such
claims draft their settlement agreements with language acknowledging
that the employee has received all compensation owed or that they have
worked no overtime without full compensation. An employer seeking to
settle FMLA claims could likewise draft a settlement agreement to in-
clude acknowledgment language suited to the situation-that the em-
ployee has received all leaves of absence or reinstatements that they are
entitled to, or that they have not been denied any requested leaves of
absence. Such acknowledgments lower the risk of subsequent litigation,
but cannot completely eliminate it.
D. THROWING THE BOOK AT EMPLOYERS: NLRB DECISIONS REMIND
EMPLOYERS THAT HANDBOOK LANGUAGE
CAN CAUSE TROUBLE
There have been several recent cases involving union attacks against
employer-provided handbooks. For example, in Lafayette Park Hotel, the
National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") overturned an employer-
won election based on the employer's work rule prohibiting false, vicious,
profane, or malicious statements about the employer.78 The Board rea-
soned that such a rule "fails to define the area of permissible conduct in a
manner clear to employees and thus causes employees to refrain from
engaging in protected activities." Additionally, a handbook rule requir-
ing employees to leave immediately after shifts was unlawfully broad be-
cause it denied off-duty workers from accessing non-working areas, like
the parking lot, to engage in concerted activity.79 Likewise, in Freund
Baking Co., a handbook policy prohibiting employees from disclosing or
using proprietary or confidential information except as required by the
job was held to be overbroad and thus warranted setting aside an election
that the employer had won thirty to three.80
A few Board decisions issued during the Survey period again reminded
employers of the importance of well-crafted employee handbooks in light
of the continuing trend of union challenges to the legality of seemingly
innocuous handbook language and work rules. In Cintas Corp., the em-
ployer maintained an employee handbook entitled "Partner Reference
Guide," which promulgated several corporate-wide provisions, one of
which promoted confidentiality by stating, "We recognize and protect the
confidentiality of any information concerning the company, its business
plans, its partners, new business efforts, customers, accounting and finan-
cial matters. '81 The handbook also stated that "violating a confidence or
unauthorized release of confidential information" is an example of be-
78. 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 828 (1998).
79. Id.
80. 336 N.L.R.B. 847, 847 (2001).
81. 344 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 2005 WL 1564863, at *1 (June 30, 2005).
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havior that could result in disciplinary action. The Union of Needle-
trades, Industrial and Textile Employees ("UNITE") argued that the
confidentiality provision limited the employees' right to discuss their
terms and conditions of employment, in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 82
The company argued, on the other hand, that the provision could not
be read that broadly and that there was no evidence that the provision
had any chilling effect upon employees' section 7 rights. Moreover, there
was evidence that the union had distributed numerous flyers identifying,
by picture, name, or number, the company's employees along with their
wage rates and other terms and conditions of employment. For example,
one flyer contained a picture of an employee with a copy of her earning
statement that showed her hourly rate of pay. Another showed a map of
the United States and listed the hourly rate of each of the employees at
several of the company's facilities. Even though the company was fully
aware that the employees had appeared in the flyers, none were
disciplined. 83
The Board noted that the rule did not explicitly restrict section 7 activ-
ity, but a violation could still exist upon a showing that (1) employees
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit section 7 activity; (2)
the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has
been applied to restrict the exercise of section 7 rights. In this case, the
Board concluded that the company's unqualified prohibition of the re-
lease of "any information" regarding "its partners" could be reasonably
construed by employees to restrict discussion of wages and other terms
and conditions of employment with their fellow employees and with the
Union.84
In Delta Brands, Inc., the Union petitioned for an election but lost by a
vote of ten to eight.85 The Union sought to overturn the election because
of a rule in the employee handbook that prohibited "vending, soliciting,
or collecting contributions for any purpose unless authorized by manage-
ment." The evidence showed that one newly hired employee was given
the employee handbook during the critical period, a second was given it
three days before the Union's election petition was filed, and a third re-
ceived it less than six months before the petition's filing. Each new em-
ployee was required to sign a written acknowledgment of responsibility
for reading and abiding by its contents. From this evidence, the Union
argued and the hearing officer agreed that the rule was overbroad, that it
was fresh in the minds of at least three employees on the election date,
and that it could have affected the election's result.8 6
82. Id. at *5.
83. Id.
84. Id.




While the Board agreed that the rule constituted an overbroad non-
solicitation rule, based on specific circumstances in the case, it concluded
that the election need not be set aside. The Board explained that an elec-
tion would be overturned only if it is proven that the employer's conduct
(1) affected employees in the bargaining unit and (2) had a reasonable
tendency to affect the outcome of the election.87
In Delta Brands' case, the non-solicitation rule was contained in a
thirty-six-page handbook, which the company did not adopt in response
to a union-organizing campaign. Unlike the hearing officer, the Board
concluded that only one employee received the handbook during the crit-
ical pre-election period, and there was no evidence that the employees'
attention was ever drawn to the rule, that the rule was ever enforced, or
that the rule affected the employees. Under these specific circumstances,
the rule could not have affected the election results.88
Importantly, the Delta Brands majority cautioned that it was ruling on
very specific facts, and that it was not altering its long-standing position
that unlawfully vague or overbroad handbook language or work rules
may be sufficient to overturn an employer-won election. In fact, it said
that under different circumstances it would reach a different conclusion.
Additionally, in light of the frequent changes in the Board's composition,
it is worth noting the dissent's observation that unlawfully vague or over-
broad handbook language always justifies the overturning of an em-
ployer-won election.89
Finally, in Fiesta Hotel Corp., the employer promulgated and main-
tained a rule prohibiting employees from engaging in conduct that "is or
has the effect of being injurious, offensive, threatening, intimidating, co-
ercing, or interfering with" other employees.90 As in Cintas Corp., the
Board observed that the rule did not explicitly restrict section 7 activities,
nor did the employer promulgate the rule in response to union activity.
Therefore, the question the Board confronted was whether the employer
had ever impermissibly applied or threatened to apply the rule to section
7 activities or whether its employees would reasonably construe the rule
as prohibiting section 7 activities.9 1
The Board concluded that a reasonable employee reading the rule
would not construe it to prohibit section 7 activities. In so concluding, the
Board explained that the rule should not be read in isolation, and im-
proper interference should not be presumed. It also observed that a pro-
hibition against threatening or abusive language does not necessarily chill
section 7 activities, because threatening and abusive language is not an
inherent aspect of union organizing or other section 7 activities. Moreo-
ver, the Board rejected the argument regarding the "unrealized poten-
87. Id. at *2.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 344 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 2005 WL 1985977, at *1 (Aug. 15, 2005).
91. Id. at *7-8.
20061 1227
SMU LAW REVIEW
tial" that the rule could be reasonably interpreted as barring lawful
union-organizing propaganda. 92
Thus, the conduct proscribed by the employer's rule in Fiesta Hotel
Corp. was no more inherently entwined with section 7 activity than in
other cases in which rules prohibiting "threatening or abusive language,"
"verbal abuse," "harassment," or "profane language" have been upheld.
The rule, the Board explained, is not so amorphous that reasonable em-
ployees would be incapable of grasping the expectations that they com-
port themselves with general notions of civility and decorum in the
workplace. 93
E. TEXAS LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS
TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION
During its 2005 legislative session, the Texas Legislature overhauled
the Texas Workers' Compensation system with House Bill 7, and most of
the changes took effect during the Survey period on September 1, 2005.
Although the legislature's extensive revisions and their impact are better
addressed by a separate article, we summarize the legislation and some of
the major changes here.
The most notable change was the elimination of the six-member Texas
Workers' Compensation Commission and the transfer of its functions to
the newly created Division of Workers' Compensation within the Texas
Department of Insurance. The legislature also authorized the establish-
ment of workers' compensation healthcare networks to provide medical
benefits, and requires those entities wishing to operate as a workers' com-
pensation healthcare network to obtain a certificate from the Commis-
sioner of Workers' Compensation. If an employer's insurance contracts
with a certified network, the employees can be required to seek and ob-
tain services through a network healthcare provider for on-the-job inju-
ries. The employer must also provide notice of network requirements to
all existing employees and new hires.
Some changes to the system that directly impact injured employees are
notable. First, the legislature raised the cap on weekly income benefits by
approximately 15% for injuries occurring on or after October 1, 2006.
The legislature also reduced by two weeks the amount of time that an
employee injured on or after September 1, 2005 must be off work in or-
der to receive benefits for the first week. Finally, one of the requirements
for continued eligibility for Supplemental Income Benefits is that the em-
ployee made a good-faith effort to find work commensurate with his or
her physical abilities, and the legislation requires the Commissioner to
adopt compliance standards defining good-faith effort.
It is worth noting that the legislature kept participation in the state's
workers' compensation system voluntary. In this regard, it is also worth




noting that the legislature outlined a procedure that a non-subscribing
employer must follow to secure a post-accident release from an injured
employee. 94 An employee can voluntarily waive a cause of action only if
he or she has knowledge of the waiver's effect. The waiver cannot be
made before nine business days have passed from initial report of injury,
and the employee must receive a medical evaluation from a nonemer-
gency doctor before signing the waiver. There are also specific require-
ments concerning the waiver's format: the waiver must be conspicuous,
meaning that it must appear in a type larger than the body of the agree-
ment or in contrasting colors.95
III. NOTEWORTHY DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. FEDERAL
1. Title VII Cases
In Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., Ivor Keelan, a citizen of the United
Kingdom, and David Sullivan, a U.S. citizen, worked for Majesco, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Mastek, an India-based company that out-
sourced software and IT solutions and technicians for its clients.96
Majesco sold Mastek's IT products and services to its U.S. customers.
Mastek hired both men as at-will employees and paid them a base salary
plus a commission structure. 97
Keelan worked for Majesco from August 2000 until November 2001,
during which he made three sales, and Mastek terminated him for non-
production. Sullivan, who worked from about March 2001 until late June
2001, produced no sales while at Majesco and resigned. Both employees
alleged that their sales performances were hindered at Majesco because
they are non-Indian. They alleged that Majesco's policy of staffing
projects solely with Indian technicians with work visas hindered their per-
formance. Sometimes, the visas would expire, forcing the technicians to
leave in the middle of a project, which caused them to lose business.
Thus, while they had sales brought to the table, sometimes they were una-
ble to secure the deal because the company would not staff the projects if
Indian technicians were unavailable. 98
Other U.S.-based salespeople encountered similar problems, and when
one asked management to explain its resistance to use local technicians,
Majesco told her, "Americans need too much handholding." Keelan and
Sullivan complained to H.R. and to some executives about discrimination
they perceived against non-Indians, to which one executive stated,
"Americans have never worked out." When Sullivan approached
Majesco's CEO, an Indian, about the apparent discrimination, the CEO's
94. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(e) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
95. § 406.033(g).





response was "I can see how you would feel that way." Additionally,
when Keelan's supervisor, a U.S. citizen, resigned, Majesco replaced him
with an Indian. Keelan then asked if Majesco had a policy of forcing out
Americans. His supervisor replied, "Is there a document out there some-
where that states that, no; is it a practice, of course it is." 99
When Majesco fell on hard times, it announced a new pay plan consist-
ing of across-the-board pay cuts and a modification of the commission
structure. Sullivan and Keelan contended the new plan provided a vehi-
cle for favoritism and discrimination, because it gave Majesco the discre-
tion to divide commissions among salesmen as it saw fit. They filed
charges of national-origin discrimination with the EEOC and then filed
suit under Title VII, alleging discrimination in the terms and conditions of
their employment, in Keelan's termination, and in Sullivan's constructive
discharge. 10°
Majesco sought and the court awarded summary judgment. The trial
court rejected the plaintiff's urging that it should analyze the case under a
mixed-motive theory because it was a pretext case. In this regard, the
trial court concluded that there was "no evidence that Majesco had legiti-
mate and illegitimate reasons" for its employment practices. Thus, under
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the trial court held that the evidence did
not support a prima facie case, because nothing showed that they were
denied any compensation due to them or that Majesco treated similarly
situated Indian employees better. Likewise, Keelan's discharge claim
failed at the prima-facie-case stage because he could not show that simi-
larly situated Indian salesmen were treated more favorably, and even if
he could, the "stray remark" evidence did not raise an issue of pretext.
Sullivan's claims failed because he did not experience subjectively or ob-
jectively intolerable working conditions. 10'
The plaintiffs appealed and raised, among others, two arguments: (1)
the trial court erred in requiring them to provide evidence of similarly
situated Indian employees receiving preferential treatment to prove-up
their respective prima facie cases, and (2) the trial court erred in refusing
to analyze the case under a mixed-motive theory and in disregarding their
evidence of the company's prejudicial mindset favoring Indians and disfa-
voring non-Indians. 102
To support their argument that the trial court erred in maintaining the
prima-facie-case elements as an exclusive approach, the plaintiffs con-
tended that their jobs were unique-Sullivan was the only "director of
alliances" and Keelan was the only Majesco salesman in charge of the
central U.S. region. Therefore, they argued that because realistic com-
parisons could not be made, they should have been able to rely on other
evidence to raise an inference of discrimination. The Fifth Circuit, how-
99. Id. at 337.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 338.
102. Id. at 338, 340.
1230 [Vol. 59
Employment Law
ever, said they had waived their argument because the plaintiffs failed to
"press" the argument sufficiently during the trial court proceedings.
Majesco's summary-judgment motion put them on notice of the absence
of similarly situated evidence, and the plaintiffs never took issue with the
defendant's statement of the prima facie case's applicable elements. In-
stead, the plaintiffs merely argued that Desert Palace changed the Title
VII landscape. 10 3
The court also pointed out that both Indian and non-Indian salesper-
sons were affected by the blanket pay and commission cuts, and the re-
cord showed that two Indian salespeople were discharged in January 2002
for nonproduction in sales. Additionally, the court observed that nothing
in the record indicated that Indian salespersons did not also encounter
the same types of staffing issues raised by plaintiffs. Thus, bound to pro-
duce similarly situated evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiffs'
evidence neither showed nor reasonably inferred better "actual" treat-
ment of Majesco's Indian salespersons in circumstances "nearly identical"
to theirs. 104
With regard to the second argument, the Fifth Circuit held that Desert
Palace "had no effect on pretext cases under McDonnell Douglas," and
that its modification of the burden-shifting analysis (adopted in Rachid) is
used where the mixed-motive analysis "may apply." The question of pre-
text versus mixed motive treatment is only reached after a prima facie
showing has been made and the defendant has responded with a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason. Here, the plaintiffs failed to meet their
prima facie burdens because they lacked evidence that similarly situated
Indians were treated more favorably. 10 5
Notably, however, the EEOC, as amicus, made the argument that re-
gardless of whether Keelan could show pretext, the evidence raised a fact
question as to whether his national origin was a motivating factor in his
discharge. In addressing this argument, the Fifth Circuit stated that even
if Keelan could arguably make a prima facie showing, the evidence "does
not raise that fact question. °10 6
Keelan also argued that the various pro-Indian statements by Majesco
executives should not have been disregarded as mere "stray remarks" in
the wake of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co.
because the remarks were outright admissions by persons controlling
company decisions.10 7 But the court held that, even if Keelan could make
a prima facie showing, Keelan created no fact issue on pretext. In this
103. Id. at 339-40. Interestingly, the court made no mention of the fact that in its recent
decision in Johnson v. Louisiana, it admonished that "the prima facie case method estab-
lished in McDonnell Douglas was never intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic."
351 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)).
104. Keelan, 407 F.3d at 345.
105. Id. at 340-41.
106. Id. at 345.
107. Id. at 344 (citing Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 342 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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regard, the court explained that Keelan presented no evidence that the
Majesco personnel who made pro-Indian remarks were involved in or
influenced the decision to fire him or that those remarks were made in
connection with his discharge. 108 In distinguishing Palasota, the court ob-
served that that case involved a review of the trial court's judgment as a
matter of law following a jury verdict for the plaintiff. In that posture,
the court explained, it was considering discriminatory remarks made in
combination with the establishment of a prima facie case and a fact issue
as to the veracity of the employer's stated grounds for termination. Thus,
in Palasota, the jury considered the plaintiff's theory of the case (that the
company sought to replace its older, largely male sales force with a
younger female one), while in the case of Keelan and Sullivan, they
waived any objection to the similarly situated theory of the case advanced
by Majesco and accepted by the trial court. 10 9
In Wilson v. Delta State University, William Wilson worked as the long-
serving director of the University's Audio-Visual Center.110 In October
2000, after the plaintiff came under the supervision of Dr. Michelle Rob-
erts, the newly appointed Chief Information and Planning Officer
("CIPO"), the relationship between the two became strained and quickly
deteriorated. Roberts announced a plan to consolidate the Audio-Visual
Center and the Instructional Technology Center, which would eliminate
the plaintiff's position. In April 2001, at a meeting with the University's
President to discuss frustrations with Roberts' department changes, the
plaintiff told the President that Roberts was not qualified for the CIPO
position and that she only got the job because she was having an affair
with a University administrator. A few weeks later, Roberts' plan was
approved and Wilson's position was eliminated. 1'
Wilson sued, alleging, among other claims, gender discrimination and
retaliation for complaining to the President about Roberts' job qualifica-
tions. The trial court granted the University's motion for summary judg-
ment for Wilson's gender-discrimination claim but denied summary
judgment for the retaliation claim. At the close of Wilson's case at trial,
the University sought and was awarded judgment as a matter of law on
the grounds that Wilson failed to establish that he engaged in protected
action because he did not complain about action that violated Title VII.
In this regard, the trial court reasoned that the University's preferential
treatment of Roberts because of her affair was not gender discrimina-
tion-such "paramour" favoritism discriminates against men and all
other women except the one paramour. 112
On appeal, Wilson argued that the Fifth Circuit's holding in Payne v.
McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores permits a plaintiff to establish pro-
108. Id. at 345-46.
109. Id. at 344 n.5.
110. 143 F. App'x 611 (5th Cir. 2005).




tected activity where he has a reasonable belief that the defendant was
engaged in unlawful employment practices. 113 Wilson's reliance on
Payne, the court explained, was misplaced because "Payne involved an
employee who believed the employer was engaged in an unlawful em-
ployment practice, even while in fact, the employer may not have been so
engaged. ' 114 Payne did not, however, involve an employee who mistak-
enly believed that an employer was engaged in an unlawful practice. And
in Wilson's case, his complaint that Roberts was unqualified and hired
because of an affair was not a practice made unlawful by Title VII be-
cause "paramour favoritism" does not run afoul of Title VII in the Fifth
Circuit. That Wilson believed to the contrary, the court explained, is
immaterial. 5
2. ADEA Cases
As we reported in last year's Survey, the Fifth Circuit case of Smith v.
City of Jackson involved the City's revision of its pay plan for police of-
ficers to bring starting salaries up to the regional average. Under the
plan, officers with less than five years' service received proportionally
greater raises than those with more seniority. A group of older officers
sued under the ADEA. In addition to the disparate-treatment claim that
the City intended to discriminate against them, they argued that the
City's pay plan had an adverse affect or disparate impact on them be-
cause of their age.11 6 In last year's Survey, we reported that the Fifth
Circuit had held that an employment policy having a "disparate impact"
on older workers is not actionable under the ADEA.117
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, however, this holding
was reversed.11 8 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens explained that the
language of ADEA section 4(a)(2) is identical to Title VII's section
703(a)(2), except for the substitution of "age" for "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Thus, the ADEA authorizes recovery in dispa-
rate-impact cases just as in Title VII.119
Unlike Title VII, however, the Court observed that the ADEA signifi-
cantly narrows its coverage by permitting any "otherwise prohibited" ac-
tion in which "the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age" (the "RFOA provision"). 120 This, the Court explained, is con-
sistent with the fact that age, unlike Title VII's protected classifications,
113. Id. at 613 (citing Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130
(5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 613-14.
116. 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), rev'd in part, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1539-40 (2005).
117. 351 F.3d at 195.
118. 125 S. Ct. at 1540.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1540-41 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)). Additionally, the Court noted that
because amendments were made only to Title VII, which expanded the scope of liability on
a disparate-impact theory, the scope of a disparate-impact claim is narrower under the
ADEA. Id. at 1545.
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commonly has relevance to an individual's capacity to engage in certain
types of employment. With that in mind, the Court held that the group of
older officers did no more than point out that the pay plan at issue was
relatively less generous to older workers than to younger ones; they did
not identify any specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan
that had an adverse impact on older workers. Moreover, the City's plan
was based on reasonable factors other than age-the perceived need to
make junior officers' salaries competitive with comparable positions in
the market. The disparate impact was therefore attributable to the City's
decision to give raises based on seniority and position, which is unques-
tionably reasonable in light of the City's goal.121
Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., like Keelan, also involves remarks indi-
cating wrongful bias, but the outcome is notably different than the one
reached in Keelan.122 In Machinchick, PB Power hired the plaintiff in
1996 to serve as a director of business development in the Houston area
and to develop new energy-sector clients. He received excellent reviews
and was promoted to Vice President in 1998. Before 2002, business de-
velopment personnel would develop new prospects and then turn those
prospects over to other personnel to make sales presentations and close
contracts. In January 2002, however, PB Power changed to a "cradle to
grave" business-development philosophy that required employees like
the plaintiff to initiate new prospects and shepherd those prospects
through the sales process to closing and beyond. At the same time, the
company released a business plan that stated that the company intended
to "hand-pick employees whose mindset resides [sic] in the 21st Century,
who are highly motivated toward the success of the company."'123
Two month later, the plaintiff's supervisor sent an email announcing
the continuation of his "recruiting plan" to "strategically hire some
younger engineers and designers to support and be mentored by the cur-
rent staff."' 124 A few days later, the supervisor sent an email to the com-
pany's human-resources department delineating the plaintiff's
shortcomings as an employee, including the belief that the plaintiff pos-
sessed "low motivation to adapt to a rapidly changing business environ-
ment and new company management style. '125 A week or so later, the
plaintiff was terminated due to performance concerns, even though he
had received no prior warnings under the company's disciplinary policy,
which encourages formal and informal discussions regarding such issues.
At the time of his termination, the plaintiff was sixty-three years old, and
his key client base and contacts were turned over to a forty-two year
old. 126
121. Id. at 1545-46.
122. 398 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2005).
123. Id. at 348-49.





Machinchick sued, alleging that his termination violated the ADEA
and TCHRA, but the trial court granted the company's motion for sum-
mary judgment. On appeal, the court noted that in order to meet the
fourth prong of the prima facie case to create an inference of age discrim-
ination, the plaintiff must show either that he was replaced by someone
younger or "otherwise discharged because of his age. ' 127  In
Machinchick's case, the court held that he established a prima facie case
with the supervisor's email and business-plan evidence. Taken together,
the court concluded that these provided evidence that the company in-
tended to assemble a younger workforce, creating an inference that
Machinchick's age was a factor in his termination. Additionally, the "age
stereotyping remarks" in the supervisor's report of his shortcomings to
human resources, including his characterization of the plaintiff as "inflex-
ible," "not adaptable," possessing a business-as-usual attitude, and having
a "low motivation to adapt" to change, created an inference that
Machinchick was terminated because of his age.128 Finally, Machinchick
presented evidence that when they first met, his supervisor asked
Machinchick if he planned on retiring, a question the court held gave rise
to an inference of discriminatory motivation behind his termination. 129
After the company articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for the termination decision, the court explained that a plaintiff relying
on pretext falters if he fails to produce evidence rebutting all of the de-
fendant's proffered non-discriminatory reasons. This is different than a
mixed-motive analysis under which a plaintiff need only prove that dis-
criminatory animus was "a motivating factor" in the adverse decision.
Under the pretext alternative, the court concluded that Machinchick
failed to raise a fact issue as to his willingness and ability to adapt to the
new cradle-to-grave business strategy. However, when the court consid-
ered Machinchick's evidence "as a whole," it concluded that a reasonable
jury could conclude that his age was a motivating factor in PB Power's
decision to terminate him, and the company could prevail on summary
judgment only by establishing that it would have terminated him even
absent considerations regarding his age. The company, however, neither
briefed nor argued that point on appeal. 130
3. § 1981 Cases
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides every person the right to make and enforce
contracts but does not contain a limitations period.13 1 Courts have tradi-
tionally applied the relevant state personal-injury limitations period. 132
In last year's Survey, we reported on the Supreme Court's 2004 ruling in
Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., in which the Court clarified that
127. Id. at 352.
128. Id. at 353.
129. Id. at 349, 352-54.
130. Id. at 354-55.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
132. See, e.g., Johnson v. Crown Enters., Inc., 398 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2005).
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claims arising under the post-1990 version of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 were sub-
ject to the catch-all four-year limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 1658.133 In
Johnson v. Crown Enterprises, Inc., the Fifth Circuit considered the sec-
tion 1981 claim brought by seasonal truck driver Johnny Johnson. 134
During his second season of hauling sugar for Dixie Harvesting, Johnson,
who is African-American, allegedly overheard a Dixie employee respon-
sible for hiring say several racist and disparaging remarks. 135 Thereafter,
Johnson and sixteen other African-American truck drivers were not
rehired. 136
Johnson originally sued Dixie and two other allegedly interrelated
companies under Title VII, contending that he was a "contract employee"
of Dixie, but he subsequently amended his complaint by adding a claim
for racial discrimination under section 1981, which does not require the
plaintiff to be an employee. Before the issuance of the Supreme Court's
decision in R.R. Donnelley & Sons, the defendants sought and were
awarded summary judgment on the grounds that Johnson's section 1981
claim was governed by Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period for tort
actions, and thus, the limitations period had run on Johnson's section
1981 claims. On appeal, Johnson argued that the one-year period was
inapplicable in light of the holding in R.R. Donnelley & Sons. The Fifth
Circuit, however, disagreed. 137
The Fifth Circuit explained that the 1991 revisions to section 1981 allow
a plaintiff to sue for post-contract-formation discrimination, such as har-
assment or termination. Johnson, however, alleged race discrimination
for the defendants' failure to enter into a new contract with him. Thus,
because his claim was not based on post-formation conduct, R.R. Donnel-
ley & Sons did not alter the limitations period for his section 1981
claim.138
4. Cases Affecting Discrimination Cases
The plaintiff in Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions began her pursuit of a gen-
der-discrimination claim under Title VII with her March 2000 filing of a
Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, and the filing of a Title VII
lawsuit in October 2002.139 In November 2000, however, she had filed a
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition. In that petition, she indicated under
penalty of perjury that she had no other contingent and unliquidated
claims of any nature and that she had no pending suits or administrative
proceedings. At no time during the Chapter 13 proceedings did she in-
133. 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004).
134. 398 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2005).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 341-42. Notably, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Johnson's complaint
amendment adding a section 1981 claim related back to the filing of his Title VII claims,
thus his claim was not time barred even under the Louisiana one-year statute of limita-
tions. Id. at 342-43.
138. Id. at 341-42.
139. 412 F.3d 598, 599 (5th Cir. 2005).
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form the court of her EEOC charge or the Title VII lawsuit. The district
court dismissed the plaintiff's lawsuit on the grounds that the claim was
judicially estopped in light of the plaintiff's failure to disclose her pending
EEOC charge and potential lawsuit during the bankruptcy
proceedings. 140
On appeal and under review for abuse of discretion, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling. Relying on Browning Manufacturing
v. Mims and Kamont v. West, the court explained that judicial estoppel
should be applied if "(1) the position of the party against which estoppel
is sought is plainly inconsistent with its prior legal position; (2) the party
against which estoppel is sought convinced a court to accept the prior
position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.'' Moreover, the
court explained that the plaintiff was under a duty both "to disclose the
existence of her pending EEOC complaint when she filed her petition
and to disclose her potential legal claims throughout the pendency of that
petition.'1 42
In the plaintiff's case, she clearly met the first two requirements. She
filed her EEOC charge eight months before filing for bankruptcy protec-
tion, concealed the charge and associated legalities despite making sev-
eral appearances, and filed the lawsuit while the bankruptcy remained
open. Likewise, the court confirmed her bankruptcy plan was based in
part on its assessment of her assets and liabilities. 143
With regard to the third element, the plaintiff argued that her failure to
inform the bankruptcy court of her other claims was inadvertent because
she relied on her bankruptcy attorney's advice that those claims were ir-
relevant. The court stated, however, that in order to prove inadvertence,
the plaintiff must show not that she was unaware of her duty to disclose,
but that she was unaware of the facts giving rise to the duty at the time of
her bankruptcy petition. Here, the plaintiff knew of the facts giving rise
to the Title VII lawsuit when she filed her November 2000 charge. More-
over, the court held that in order for judicial estoppel to apply in this
case, there must be no motive for concealment. But here, the plaintiff
had an incentive to conceal her claims from creditors. Thus, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to the
plaintiff's Title VII lawsuit. 144
140. Id.
141. Id. at 600.
142. Id.
143. Id.





In City of Houston v. Fletcher, the plaintiff asserted that her former
employer, the City of Houston, subjected her to a hostile work environ-
ment, discriminated against her, and terminated her, on the basis of her
age in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
("TCHRA"). 46 On appeal of the jury verdict against it, the City urged
that the trial court erred in submitting an instruction to the jury on the
plaintiff's hostile-work-environment claim. The court observed that
Texas state courts have not addressed whether an age-based hostile-work-
environment claim is available under the TCHRA, nor has the Fifth Cir-
cuit addressed whether a hostile-work-environment claim is available
under the ADEA. However, because other federal appellate and trial
courts have recognized such a claim, the court concluded that an age-
based hostile work environment claim is actionable under the
TCHRA.1 47
The plaintiff in Attieh v. University of Texas at Austin was the Chair of
the University's Course and Curriculum Committee, Coordinator of the
Arabic language program, and undergraduate advisor.148 She was also a
Senior Lecturer, which was not a tenured position, but was subject to
renewal annually. She gained these positions in part due to her strong
personal and professional bond with Dr. Peter Abboud, the Chair of the
Department of Middle Eastern Languages and Culture. In 1998, a Uni-
versity committee charged with investigating alleged problems within the
department issued a report with many findings, including that Senior Lec-
turers with supervisory roles over tenure-track faculty was problematic
and undesirable, that Attieh had extraordinary unofficial influence and
responsibilities in the department, and that that influence had unhealthy
effects on the functioning of the department. Immediately, Dr. Harold
Liebowitz was appointed Chair of the Department. 149
Soon thereafter, Liebowitz met with Attieh to discuss her performance
deficiencies and to outline areas to improve. Liebowitz also requested
that Attieh give up her large office so that he could have it as Chairman.
Attieh complained to the Dean and the University's grievance committee
about the meeting, alleging that Liebowitz threatened to terminate her if
she did not change her teaching methods. Further, she complained that
145. The Commission on Human Rights was recently abolished, and its powers and
duties were transferred to the newly created Civil Rights Division of the Texas Workforce
Commission. See Act of May 30, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 302, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1279.
This enactment became effective on September 1, 2004. Id. However, most courts
continue to refer to the Texas anti-discrimination statute as the "TCHRA," therefore, we
refer to it as such in this Article.
146. 166 S.W.3d 479, 483 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, pet. denied).
147. Id. at 489.
148. No. 03-04-00450-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4662 (Tex. App.-Austin June 16,
2005, no pet. h.).
149. Id. at *24.
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her removal from her office broke up the "Arabic enclave" housing the
Arabic-language faculty and student labs. She explained that students
and faculty had agreed to "speak Arabic in this area and that Liebowitz's
presence would disrupt this practice and undermine the total immersion
instruction method employed by the Arabic language faculty. '150
Additionally, shortly after the appointment, a student alleged that
Liebowitz made a racist remark about Palestinian Arabs while leading an
Israeli archeological dig. When a graduate student within the department
voiced concerns to the Dean about the treatment accorded to Attieh and
the Arabic department generally, Liebowitz called a faculty meeting to
address "political issues" facing the department and stated that the
"ongoing, debilitating, obstructionist, and uncouth behavior" of Attieh,
Abboud, and himself needed to stop.' 5 1 Attieh, Abboud, and other
Arabic graduate students nonetheless continued to complain in letters
and at meetings about what they perceived to be efforts to marginalize
the Arabic language program.1 52
In 1999, the University granted Liebowitz's request for an additional
teaching position for the Arabic language program, conditioned on the
understanding that it would be a tenured one. Initially, "Liebowitz
thought that the new professorship would be an additional position but
he soon learned that it would replace the Senior Lecturer position,
thereby eliminating Attieh's job. 1 53 Attieh applied for the newly cre-
ated position, but was not selected for an interview. Although Abboud
complained about the fairness of the process toward Attieh, she was not
granted an interview, and a Palestinian Arab was hired. 154
Attieh sued, complaining of national-origin discrimination and retalia-
tion in violation of the TCHRA. She claimed that "her position was
eliminated and that she was prevented from interviewing for the new po-
sition in retaliation for complaints that she and others made regarding the
allegedly disparate treatment of herself and the Arabic program by
Liebowitz. 1' 55 The trial court, however, granted the University's sum-
mary-judgment motion without explanation.1 56
On appeal, the court reiterated that the establishment of a prima facie
case of retaliation requires a showing that the plaintiff engaged in pro-
tected activity. In this regard, even though she never directly or indi-
rectly voiced an opinion as to whether the alleged disparate treatment of
her and the Arabic language program was based on race or national ori-
gin until her letter to the University's EEO office, Attieh argued on ap-
peal that her complaints should be considered protected activity because
they were constructive complaints about discrimination. She urged that
150. Id. at *4-5.
151. Id. at *7-8.
152. Id. at *5-7.
153. Id. at *8.
154. Id. at *9.
155. Id. at *13.
156. Id. at *10.
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the long history of tension within the Department between Jewish and
Arabic faculty members, the geopolitical history involving Jews and Pal-
estinian Arabs, and the allegation that Liebowitz, a Jew, made disparag-
ing remarks about Palestinian Arabs supported her argument. 157
Attieh also argued that her refusal to oblige Liebowitz's request to dis-
pel inflammatory racial allegations regarding him was perceived to be
protected activity. In support, Attieh urged the court to liberally con-
strue remedial statutes like the TCHRA because the purpose of such stat-
utes is not served by strictly adhering to the plain language. 158 For
example, in Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., the Third Circuit held that
retaliation exists even if the employer's reason is based on the employer's
mistaken perception that the employee engaged in a protected activity.' 59
The appellate court, however, refused to accept Attieh's characteriza-
tion of the global relationship between Jews and Arabs as evidence of the
motivation for the University's decisions. Such evidence, at best, con-
cerns discrimination against the Arabic language department and not
against Attieh personally based on her race or national origin.160 More
importantly, the court also explained that, unlike the federal statute at
issue in Fogleman, the plain language of Texas Labor Code section 21.055
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who engaged
in protected activity, which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that she
actually engaged in protected activity. Therefore, the court held that
it is irrelevant whether the University mistakenly perceived that At-
tieh had engaged in a protected activity because statutorily it could
not retaliate against her until she actually did so. Likewise, the mere
anticipation that Attieh might engage in protected activity in the fu-
ture [would be] insufficient to establish that the University retaliated
against her under [the TCHRA]. 161
VI. FAMILY & MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
In addition to reshaping the analysis of FMLA retaliation claims (dis-
cussed in the previous section regarding significant developments in
2005), the courts continued to clarify some of the technical aspects of the
FMLA that are not clearly defined by Congress in the Act.
The FMLA applies to employers with fifty or more employees within a
seventy-five-mile radius, but the Act does not define a method for mea-
suring those miles. 162 During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit cleared
up some of the confusion regarding how to measure miles under the
157. Id. at *11-13.
158. Id. at *16-19.
159. 283 F.3d 561, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1996). In Grosso v. City Univ. of N.Y., Queens Coll.,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York also held, in light of
Fogleman, that a "perception theory of retaliation" is actionable under Title VII. No. 03-
CV-2619 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4089, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2005).
160. Attieh, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4662, at *14-15.
161. Id. at *20-21.
162. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(1)(B)(ii).
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FMLA. In Bellum v. PCE Constructors, Inc., the employee argued that
the distance between his work location and the company's headquarters
should be measured by linear miles-"as the crow flies. '163 Relying on a
DOL regulation, the company argued that the distance should be mea-
sured by "surface miles, using surface transportation over public streets,
roads, highways, and waterways." The regulation states that a linear, or
"as the crow flies," method should only be used when there in no availa-
ble transportation between sites. 164 In a rare showing of great deference
to agency regulations, the Fifth Circuit held that, "the decision of Con-
gress not to define a method for measuring the 75-mile distance consti-
tutes an implicit statutory gap the Secretary of Labor is authorized to fill
by 29 U.S.C. § 2654."165 Thus, at least in the Fifth Circuit, the appropri-
ate method for measuring distance under the FMLA is by surface miles.
V. WAGE & HOUR
In a recent consolidated opinion, IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez and Tum v. Bar-
ber Foods, Inc., a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that employees
must be compensated under the FLSA (as amended by the Portal-to-Por-
tal Act of 1947) for time spent walking from their employer's locker room
to the work floor after "donning," or putting on, unique protective gear,
as well as time spent waiting to "doff," or take off, unique protective
gear. 166 The Court also held that time spent waiting to don protective
gear is excluded from FLSA coverage by the Portal-to-Portal Act and
that employers are not required to compensate employees for that wait-
ing time.1 67
At IBP, a large producer of fresh-meat products in Washington state,
all production workers were required to wear outer garments and per-
sonal protective equipment such as hardhats, hairnets, earplugs, gloves,
sleeves, aprons, leggings, and boots.168 Many of them, particularly those
who used knives, also had to wear a variety of protective equipment for
their hands, arms, torsos, and legs. This gear included chain-link metal
aprons, vests, plexiglass armguards, and special gloves. The company re-
quired its employees to store their equipment and tools in company
locker rooms, where most of them don their protective gear. Under IBP
policy, production employees were compensated only from the time they
cut and bagged that day's first piece of meat until the time they cut and
bagged their last piece of meat. IBP also paid production employees for
four minutes of clothes-changing time. IBP employees filed a collective
action under the FLSA to recover compensation for "pre-production and
post-production work, including the time spent donning and doffing pro-
163. 407 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 2005).
164. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(b)).
165. Id. at 739-40.
166. 126 S. Ct. 514, 525, 527 (2005).
167. Id. at 527.
168. Id. at 521.
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tective gear and walking between the locker rooms and production floor
before and after their assigned shifts."' 69
The district court held that donning and doffing protective gear was
unique to the jobs at issue and were thus compensable under the FLSA.
The Ninth Circuit Cout of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the question of whether an activity is "an
integral and indispensable part of the principal activities" is "context spe-
cific."' 170 The Ninth Circuit endorsed the distinction between the burden-
some donning and doffing of elaborate protective gear, and the time
spent donning and doffing non-unique gear, such as hard hats and safety
goggles.' 71
Barber Foods, a poultry processor in Maine, required production em-
ployees to wear different combinations of protective clothing. Under
Barber Foods' policy, the official workday for production employees
started from the time they punched in at computerized time clocks near
the production-floor entrance. Barber employees and former employees
brought an action claiming that Barber's failure to compensate them for
time spent donning and doffing the required protective gear and the at-
tendant walking and waiting time violated the FLSA.172 The U.S. District
Court for Maine held that the donning and doffing of clothing and equip-
ment required by the company or by government regulation was compen-
sable because it was an integral part of the employee's work. The district
court also held that any time spent waiting to change into or out of such
clothing or equipment was not compensable. 173 The First Circuit Court
of Appeals subsequently affirmed the district court and further held that
walking time before donning and after doffing, as well as waiting time
associated with donning and doffing, were excluded from FLSA
coverage.174
Congress originally enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act, a significant
amendment to the FLSA, in response to a controversial U.S. Supreme
Court decision.' 75 The Portal-to-Portal Act makes certain "preliminary
or postliminary" work non-compensable. In particular, section 4(a)(2)
excludes "[a]ctivities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said
principal activity or activities which occur either prior to the time on any
particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to
the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal
activity or activities."' 76 The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in IBP and
169. Id. at 521-22.
170. Id. at 522 (citing Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2003)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 525-26.
173. Id. at 526 (citing Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., No. 00-371-P-6, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1064, at *23-24, *30 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2002)).
174. Id. at 526-27 (citing TRm v. Barber Foods, Inc. 331 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003)).
175. Id. at 519.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2) (1996).
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Barber Foods turned upon the Court's interpretation of sections 4(a)(1)
and (2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that time spent
walking to or from the work floor after donning or before doffing unique
gear was compensable because the donning and doffing were "sufficiently
principal" activities. The Court stated that IBP's employee locker rooms,
where the special gear was donned and doffed, were the relevant "places
of performance" of the principal activity. Importantly, the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that the walking in IBP was fundamentally different
than walking to a place of performance before starting work-an act ex-
pressly excluded from FLSA coverage by the Portal-to Portal Act. In-
stead, the Court analogized the facts of IBP to time spent walking
between two different positions on an assembly line, which is compensa-
ble under the Act. 177
Ultimately, the Court held that any activity that is "integral and indis-
pensable" to a "principal activity," like donning and doffing unique pro-
tective gear, is itself a "principal activity" under section 4(a) of the Portal-
to-Portal Act.
Moreover, the Court held that, during a continuous workday, any walk-
ing time that occurs after the beginning of the employee's first principal
activity and before the end of the employee's last principal activity is
compensable under the FLSA. 178
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court also reversed Barber Foods in part,
holding that because doffing gear that is "integral and indispensable" to
an employee's work is a "principal activity," time spent waiting to doff is
also compensable. However, time spent waiting to don protective gear
was deemed not "integral and indispensable," but rather "preliminary."
Therefore, the Court held that time spent waiting to don protective gear
was not compensable under the FLSA. 179
Although the liability to individual employees for misclassifying walk-
ing time may not be substantial enough to create a financial crisis, the
collective amount owed to a large group of employees, particularly when
calculated over the weeks and months of non-compliance, may create a
significant negative impact on the employer's bottom line. Because of the
anticipated increase in collective-action lawsuits in this area, employers
should consult with counsel to determine whether their compensation
practices are compliant with the FLSA and the IBP decision.
VI. TEXAS-SPECIFIC CASES
A. NON-COMPETITION & MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
There is currently a split among the Texas appeals courts regarding the
test used to determine whether a covenant not to compete is ancillary to
177. IBP, 126 S. Ct. at 524.
178. Id. at 525.
179. Id. at 527.
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or part of an otherwise-enforceable agreement. Under one line of cases,
an ancillary agreement becomes enforceable when the employer provides
confidential information, even if the exchange does not occur when the
employee signs the contract. The promise to give trade secrets and the
return promise not to disclose them creates an "otherwise enforceable
agreement" that meets the requirements under the Texas Noncompete
Act.180 A recent trend, spearheaded by the Austin Court of Appeals, is
to substitute this test with a very narrow test, requiring proof that there
was a contemporaneous or instantaneous exchange of confidential infor-
mation at the time of execution. 181 This split among the courts reinforces
the uncertainty parties have regarding the enforceability of noncompete
agreements that has plagued Texas employers and employees alike for
decades.
Guidance from the Texas Supreme Court, however, may be on its way.
In November 2003, the court heard oral argument on Alex Sheshunoff
Management Services, LP v. Johnson-a case pending in the supreme
court at the time of this Article's submission that challenges the narrow,
instantly enforceable ancillary-agreement test advanced by the Austin
Court of Appeals. 182 In that case, the appeals court relied on the narrow,
instantly enforceable ancillary-agreement test to affirm the trial court's
summary judgment, holding that the noncompete at issue was unenforce-
able as a matter of law. The appeals court held that the employer's prom-
ise was illusory for two reasons: 1) because the employer could escape its
obligation to perform by firing the employee immediately after he en-
tered into the agreement; and 2) because the employee already had ac-
cess to special training and confidential information at the time the
agreement was executed.183
On appeal, the employer argued that the Sheshunoff holding conflicts
with both the Texas Noncompete Act and the Texas Supreme Court's
interpretation of that statute in Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Texas. The
employer first contended that the employee's preexisting exposure to the
confidential information at the time of the agreement did not make the
noncompete unenforceable because the employer made a binding prom-
ise of future performance. The employer was required to provide train-
ing and access to confidential information during the term of the
agreement, and only a breach of that duty would excuse the employee
from his noncompete obligations. The employer further argued that con-
tinued access to confidential information is a thing of value in and of
itself, regardless of whether new confidential information is provided.
The employee, also relying on Light, countered that the Austin Court of
180. See, e.g., Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642, 647 n.14 (Tex. 1994).
181. See, e.g., Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs. v. Johnson, 124 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2003, pet. granted).
182. Transcript of Oral Argument Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs. v. Johnson (No. 03-
1050), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/audio [hereinafter
Transcript].
183. Sheshunoff, 124 S.W.3d at 689.
[Vol. 591244
Employment Law
Appeals was correct in holding that the promises made by the employer
to provide training and confidential information were terminable at will
and were therefore illusory and unenforceable. 184
At oral argument, the Texas Supreme Court quickly honed in on the
dilemma Texas employers face in protecting their confidential informa-
tion and trade secrets. One justice recognized that if an employee can't
consider confidential information in the future or the past, there is noth-
ing left except what it hands the employee on the day of the contract.
Another justice questioned whether a contract could ever have a nonil-
lusory promise that is terminable at will. Although the employee argued
that a nonillusory promise would support a noncompete clause, when
asked to identify three promises that would meet this requirement, he
was hard pressed to give even one example. The employee's only exam-
ple of facts that would meet the narrow Sheshunoff test are those facts in
the Light case.185 In Light, the employer promised specialized training-
training that it was obligated to provide to the employee even if it termi-
nated the employee five minutes after the agreement. 186
Acknowledging that Light is the supreme court's most recent pro-
nouncement on this issue, one justice noted that, "this Court is in the
position of saying people who promised [not to] go to work in the area
for a year can break that promise."'1 87 Nevertheless, the supreme court,
citing the advent of the Internet, recognized that the world has changed
since Light. Perhaps this signifies that the Texas Supreme Court is ready
to relax its stance on noncompete agreements. The supreme court
pointed to its holdings that enforce arbitration agreements created after
employment has commenced and questioned why the same reasoning
would not lead to a conclusion that there would be sufficient considera-
tion to support a noncompete agreement in the same context. Specifi-
cally, the supreme court asked why the quid pro quo for keeping the
employee's high-level position could not be his agreement to sign the
noncompete. The employee responded by stressing that the question is
not whether the consideration will generally support the contract, but
whether the consideration gives rise to not competing. At least one jus-
tice expressed that continued employment in a high-level position cou-
pled with the employee's severance rights upon termination would be
sufficient motivation to agree not to compete.1 88
The Sheshunoff decision will be the Texas Supreme Court's first state-
ment on the enforceability of noncompetes in over a decade. The poten-
tial impact that this decision could have is evidenced by the fact that two
amicus briefs were filed in this case.189 Perhaps the supreme court is
184. Transcript, supra note 182.
185. Id.
186. Light, 883 S.W.2d at 646.
187. Transcript, supra note 182.
188. Id.




ready to recognize that the Texas Noncompete Act does not prohibit an
at-will ancillary agreement. 190 Then again, the supreme court might be
ready to once again take on the legislative branch and renew its fight
against enforcing noncompete agreements. Texas employers and employ-
ees can only hope that, regardless of the outcome, the Texas Supreme
Court will provide a clear and predictable standard that will eliminate, or
at least reduce, the current uncertainty regarding noncompete
agreements.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals decision in Sands v. Estate of Buys
evidences a trend likely to tighten the reins on trade-secrets claims. In
that case, the district court granted a temporary injunction based on the
company's probable right to recovery on its misappropriation of trade
secrets claim against a former employee. The appeals court reversed the
trial court's temporary injunction based on its conclusion that the identity
of the company's clients was not a trade secret. 19 1
Sands, a certified public accountant, sold his accounting practice to
James C. Buys & Associates, P.C. ("Buys") in February 2000. The
purchase agreement between the parties included a covenant not to com-
pete. Sands later became a full-time employee of Buys as the manager of
Buys' Plano office. After Buys' death in 2004, Sands attempted to repur-
chase the Plano office. In Sand's offer letter, he informed Buys' estate
that he intended to start his own accounting office if the parties could not
reach an agreement. Buys' estate declined Sands offer, and Sands re-
signed on August 17, 2004, effective on August 31, 2004.192
Buys' estate obtained a temporary restraining order against Sands in
order to prevent him from accessing, using, or disclosing Buys' trade
secrets. The estate then sued Sands for misappropriation of Buys' trade
secrets and confidential information and for breach of the covenant not
to compete. The trial court held that the covenant not to compete was
unenforceable but granted a temporary injunction barring Sands from
"contacting, soliciting or accepting any business" from Buys' clients. 193
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court, holding that
the evidence presented at the temporary . . . injunction hearing
clearly shows that the identities of the Corporation's clients, al-
though of some value to the Corporation and its competitors, were
not confidential. Indeed, the only evidence of confidentiality
presented at the hearing was the Corporation's use of passwords and
firewall protection on its computers-precautionary measures that
are virtually universal on office and home computers alike. The evi-
dence further shows that many of the clients' identities were known
outside the Corporation's business and could be easily and properly
190. See SENATE COMM. ON JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 7, 73d Leg.,
R.S. (1993) (amendment was needed to clarify that the Act does accept ancillary agree-
ments that are "at-will").
191. 160 S.W.3d 684, 686-87, 691 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
192. Id. at 685-86.




Although it is unclear how other Texas courts will react to this decision, it
appears that companies may have a very difficult time establishing that
customer lists constitute trade secrets in the Texas court system.
B. DEFAMATION
It is common for plaintiffs alleging discrimination or harassment by
their supervisor to also allege that the same conduct constitutes negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision by the employer. Such attempts to
"tortify" the statutory anti-discrimination provisions, however, have been
resoundingly rejected by state and federal courts based on the fundamen-
tal tort-law principle that an employer cannot be held liable unless its
employee committed an actionable underlying tort at common law. And
because harassment and discrimination are not common-law torts, the
negligent failure to prevent them is not actionable. 195
In Oliphint v. Richards, the court addressed a variation on this princi-
ple.196 Oliphint was employed at Jacobs Engineering. After a heated dis-
cussion with a supervisor, he was called into his direct supervisor's office
to be terminated. After telling his side of the story, Oliphint told his di-
rect supervisor, Richards, that he wanted to quit. He claimed that Rich-
ards told him that his separation would be documented as a resignation.
Richards denied this version of events and wrote that Oliphint was termi-
nated for performance and other problems, "all of which are related to
alcohol."197
In 1991, when Oliphint subsequently interviewed for a job and told his
prospective employer that he resigned from his previous position, the in-
terviewer said he "could not take a liar." When Oliphint pressed to un-
derstand more details, the interviewer said, "that is not what [Jacobs] told
me." Oliphint alleged that he was turned down for other jobs in the
1990s, and when he was not satisfied with the results of a 2002 job search,
he hired a private investigator to check all of his references. When the
private investigator called Jacobs Engineering, the company would only
verify dates of employment and positions held, but when he reached
194. Id. at 690-91.
195. See Castillo v. Gared, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 781, 784-85 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, pet. denied); Gonzales v. Willis, 995 S.W.2d 729, 738 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999,
no pet.); Garcia v. Allen, 28 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. de-
nied); Host Marriott Corp. v. Meadows, No. 05-00-00959-CV, 2001 WL 727341, at *2 (Tex.
App.-Dallas June 29, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Centennial Ins. Co.
v. Bailey, No. 05-98-00007-CV, 2000 WL 1515158, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 12, 2000,
no pet.) (not designated for publication); Carlson v. Rockwell Space Operations Co., 985
F. Supp. 674, 691-92 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Nichols v. Apartment Temps., Inc., No. Civ.3:99-CV-
2538-86, 2001 WL 182701, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2001); Griego v. United States, No. EP-
99-CA-164-DB, 2000 WL 33348763, at *6 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2000); Gonzales v. Fid. Dis-
trib. Corp., No. Civ.A.3:00-04-1197, 2003 WL 21266707, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2003);
Johnson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Tex., 375 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
196. 167 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
197. Id. at 515.
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Richards directly, he told the investigator that Oliphint had been termi-
nated for "substance abuse problems. '198
Based on Richards' statement to the investigator, Oliphint sued Rich-
ards and Jacobs Engineering for, among other claims, defamation and
negligence. The trial court, however, granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and Oliphint appealed. 199
On appeal, the court ruled that Oliphint's defamation claim was barred
because he consented to or invited publication of the statement at issue.
The court explained that though he may not have known the exact words
that would be said, the undisputed evidence showed that Oliphint clearly
had reason to expect a defamatory statement. Further, by hiring an in-
vestigator to check his references under these circumstances, he invited
the defamation.20°
With regard to Oliphint's negligence claim, the defendants argued that
it was merely the defamation claim with a different label. Oliphint, on
the other hand, relied on Mitre v. Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc., which al-
lowed customers to sue individual shop owners for negligence and defa-
mation after flyers accusing the customers of passing counterfeit bills
were posted in shops.201 Mitre held that because the customers' defama-
tion claim was based on a negligence standard, the customers could also
assert a negligence claim based on that duty.202
The Oliphint court, however, disagreed. The court admonished against
fracturing one cause of action by massaging the labels and language. Ad-
ditionally, the court explained that Mitre was wrongly decided because,
while defamation involving a public figure contains a negligence-liability
standard, that standard is a component of the defamation claim itself and
not a separate claim.203
VII. NOTABLE PENDING CASES
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.204-In this case, a bartender-waitress won a
jury verdict on a sexual-harassment claim, but it was overturned for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction after the restaurant submitted post-judg-
ment evidence that it had less than the minimum number of employees
required under Title VII's definition of "employer." The question con-
fronting the U.S. Supreme Court is whether the fifteen-employee require-
ment is jurisdictional or a waivable defense.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White2 5-In accepting
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 516.
201. Id. at 517 (citing Mitre v. Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
202. Mitre, 840 S.W.2d at 623.
203. Oliphint, 167 S.W.3d at 518.
204. 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 544 U.S. 1031 (2005).




Burlington Northern's petition for certiorari from a Sixth Circuit deci-
sion, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider defining the appropriate
standard for determining whether a female railroad worker who com-
plained about sexual harassment was retaliated against in violation of Ti-
tle VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit decided, en banc,
that the plaintiff, who was transferred to a more physically demanding
job and suspended without pay for thirty-seven days, was retaliated
against in violation of Title VII. Despite the fact that the transfer did not
result in a loss of pay or benefits and the railroad reinstated her with back
pay, all thirteen appeals-court judges decided that she was subjected to an
adverse employment action. The judges disagreed, however, on the ap-
propriate standard for determining what constitutes an adverse employ-
ment action. Eight of the judges reaffirmed the appellate panel's view
that a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination must show that she
suffered a materially adverse change in the terms of her employment.
The other five judges backed a standard that has been advocated by the
EEOC and adopted by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, namely, that an
employment action is sufficiently adverse if it is reasonably likely to deter
employees from engaging in protected conduct.
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